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The Newclear Family: The Broadening
Recognition of Non-Traditional Families
and Where to Draw the Line
Ally Nicol†
Introduction
In the past fifty years, American politics and public opinion
have shifted regarding parentage and what constitutes a family. In
the wake of cases such as Holtzman v. Knott,1 Johnson v. Calvert,2
K.M. v. E.G.,3 Obergefell v. Hodges,4 and In re M.C.,5 the rights of
same-sex and other “non-traditional” parents have been clarified
and expanded. Biology and marriage have long been the most
commonly used means of establishing parental rights, and now
those recognitions, particularly in the wake of Obergefell, are widely
available to most couples.6 While this recognition has been longawaited in the LGBT community, issues remain regarding legal
parent status based solely on biology and the legal status of nontraditional families. As the law expands to recognize a more diverse
spectrum of parents, new issues will arise regarding when parental
status should not be granted, as opposed to how parental rights
should be expanded.
†. J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2018; B.A., University
of Wisconsin, 2012. Ally would like to thank the Staffers and Editors of Law &
Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice for their efforts in preparing this Note
for publication. Ally would also like to thank Professor June Carbone for
contributing her expertise on this topic. Finally, Ally would like to thank her
partner, Tessa, for being an invaluable sounding board and for making her life an
endless adventure.
1. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
2. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
3. 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
4. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
5. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197 (Cal. App. 2d 2011), superseded by statute 2013 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Ch. 564 (S.B. 274) (West). “Most children have two parents, but in rare
cases, children have more than two people who are that child’s parent in every
way . . . . The purpose of this bill is to abrogate In re M.C. . . . insofar as it held that
where there are more than two people who have a claim to parentage under the
Uniform Parentage Act, courts are prohibited from recognizing more than two of
these people as the parents of a child, regardless of the circumstances.” Cal. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 564 § 1(b) (italics added).
6. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 1185, 1190–91 (2016) (discussing generally the impact of marriage equality and
families formed through assisted reproductive technologies).
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Holtzman v. Knott was the first decision in the United States
in which a court recognized a lesbian as a “de facto parent” of a child
conceived and delivered by her partner during the course of their
relationship.7 Johnson v. Calvert involved a husband and wife who
implanted their fertilized egg into a surrogate, who then claimed to
be the mother after the child was born.8 The court established an
“intent test” in California, which determines legal parent status by
looking to the parties’ intent if a court holds that the Uniform
Parentage Act (UPA) does not apply.9 In K.M. v. E.G., before
separating, two women conceived twins together, with one
intending to be only an egg donor with no parental rights and the
other intending to be the legal mother via in vitro fertilization
(IVF).10 When the biological mother claimed parentage over the
birth mother after their relationship dissolved, the court found that
both were legal parents, as evidenced by their co-maternal ties in
addition to their marriage-like relationship.11 The court essentially
created a new rule in California, looking beyond the UPA and the
Johnson intent test to hold both parties as functional legal parents,
regardless of their intentions.
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
same-sex couples have the fundamental right to marriage.12
However, this decision also introduced new questions regarding the
recognition of both biological and non-biological parents in both
marital and non-marital families.13 In re M.C. featured three
individuals with parental claims: a biological mother, her same-sex
spouse, and the biological father, with whom the biological mother
had a sexual relationship beyond that of a sperm donor.14 The case
itself failed to establish that three individuals could be deemed legal
parents to a child under the UPA.15 However, it led to the California
legislature passing a multiple-parent bill, which allows a court to
7. William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in Holtzman v.
Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST.
135, 135 (2013).
8. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
9. Id. at 782.
10. 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005).
11. Id. at 679 (“K.M. did not intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather
provided her ova to her lesbian partner with whom she was living so that E.G. could
give birth to a child that would be raised in their joint home.”).
12. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015).
13. See, e.g., Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Iowa
2013) (analyzing whether the non-birthing spouse in a lesbian marriage must be
listed on a child’s birth certificate).
14. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197, 202–03 (Cal. App. 2d 2011).
15. Id. at 214.
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find more than two legal parents if not doing so would be
detrimental to the child.16
These cases illustrate a shift toward a broader recognition of
parentage, one that moves beyond biology as the primary
determinant of parentage, by recognizing parental rights outside of
marriage. Marriage equality arguably facilitates the development
of non-traditional parentage concepts across family law and serves
as a platform on which to justify further expansion of the traditional
parentage model both in and outside marriage.17 By challenging
norms once considered fundamental to parenthood and by
encouraging a model of parenthood that derives parentage from
intent and conduct rather than biology and marriage, all families
have the opportunity to obtain legal recognition.
This Note argues that the recognition of same-sex marriage in
Obergefell will continue to broaden the recognition of other nontraditional family structures and, more specifically, non-biological
parents and multi-parent families. Same-sex marriage supports a
parentage structure that reduces the importance of biology and
gender and instead focuses on the intent and conduct of those
holding themselves out as a family. The logical next step is to
expand this understanding of parentage to include, by default,
parents who have no biological tie to the child, single or multiple
biological parents,18 and to recognize all families, both in and
outside of marriage. This Note also argues that in the wake of this
progress, it will become increasingly important to establish where
the line is regarding the recognition of legal parents. While a shift
toward a functional or intent-based model of parentage is a smart
step for the courts to take, there remain issues in the framework as
it exists and where it is headed, specifically in situations when the
court should not grant parental rights to someone who might
traditionally have a legally recognized parental relationship to a
child, such as through biology or marriage.
This Note utilizes case law to illustrate the chronological
journey toward our present day and what potentially lies ahead in
the realm of non-traditional family law. Part I provides a brief
16. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2017) (“In an appropriate action, a court may
find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are
parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to
the child.”).
17. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1190.
18. See Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent In Vitro Fertilization: Gene
Replacement for the Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial Diseases, 101 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 31, 32–34 (2014) (explaining mitochondrial replacement therapy (MRT)
in depth).
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background of the political and social climate leading to where we
are today regarding non-traditional family rights and highlights
how the notion of the traditional family structure shifted
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, leading to new legal rights
established in the 1990s for non-biological parents in same-sex
relationships. Part II discusses the legal status of same-sex families
prior to marriage equality and the various ways in which same-sex
parents achieved legal status. Part III outlines the post-Obergefell
changes in family law, specifically regarding the recognition of
functional and intentional parentage and ponders what lies ahead
for non-traditional families in the wake of advancement in
reproductive technologies. Part IV attempts to draw a line using a
conduct-based standard regarding situations when a court should
not award legal parental rights to an individual who might
otherwise have a legal claim, biological or otherwise, to a child.
I.

Background

The growth of parent-child relationships outside of marriage
was primarily a response to changes in American family life.19 With
the introduction of no-fault divorce in the late 1960s and its
widespread application by the late 1980s, divorce was more widely
available and easier to obtain.20 As divorced parents and single
mothers formed new families, stepparents filled in and assumed
parental roles.21 Stepparent adoption was a mechanism for
recognizing non-biological parents by providing parental rights to
the stepparent.22 Prior to marriage equality, same-sex couples had
no similar mechanism for recognizing non-biological or third party
parents.23 Beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s,24 same-sex couples
could pursue second-parent adoptions, which essentially adapted
the stepparent adoption model and allowed a same-sex partner to
adopt their partner’s biological or adoptive child without
terminating the first parent’s legal parental status.25

19. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1195–1196.
20. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce
and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1987) (stating that in 1969, California
adopted the first no-fault divorce law in the United States and that by 1987, no-fault
divorce was available in all 50 states).
21. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to Their
Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 82 (2006).
22. Id. at 107.
23. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1201.
24. Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 17, 28 (2013).
25. Id. at 28–29.
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In 1995, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in Holtzman v.
Knott that a lesbian partner could be granted de facto parenthood
when the following factors were present:
(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a
parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner
and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and
development, including contributing towards the child’s
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4)
that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of
time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature.26

If de facto parenthood is established, then the appropriate
standard for determining visitation would be what is in the “best
interest of the child,” regardless of biological ties or the gender of
the person seeking recognition.27 Holtzman was the first decision
to recognize a lesbian as a de facto parent.28 The issue of a nonbiological parent’s ability to be recognized as a parent was becoming
increasingly important at the time of Holtzman, as the number of
same-sex couples having children was on the rise.29 The Holtzman
four-factor test is a balanced and reliable method for determining
when standing should be granted to a non-legally recognized parent
suing the legally recognized parent for visitation with a child.30 The
dissent in Holtzman stated a concern commonly heard in the fight
for marriage equality—that by recognizing same-sex parents, legal
parents could then be sued by any third party who might choose to
assert parental rights to the child.31
In Johnson v. Calvert, a married couple used the husband’s
sperm to fertilize the wife’s egg via IVF and then implanted the
fertilized egg in a surrogate.32 After the child was born, both the

26. Holtzman v. Knott (In re Custody of H.S.H.-K), 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis.
1995); see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000) (“[T]he legal parent must
consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; the third
party must have lived with the child; the third party must perform parental
functions for the child to a significant degree; and most important, a parent-child
bond must be forged.”).
27. Holtzman, 553 N.W.2d at 421.
28. See Turner, supra note 7.
29. See NeJaime, supra note 6, at 1197.
30. Beth Neu, Wisconsin Brings Child Visitation out of the Closet by Granting
Standing to Nonparents in Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis.),
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 475 (1995), 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 915 (1996).
31. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d at 441–42 (Day, J., concurring and dissenting).
32. 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
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wife and surrogate claimed to be the child’s mother.33 The court
held that both women potentially had valid claims to being the
natural mother.34 However, looking at the parties’ intentions, the
court found that the wife was the child’s natural mother because
she intended to be the mother at the time of conception via IVF and
implantation.35 The court denied the surrogate mother legal
parental status despite her potential claim as mother under the
UPA, which provides parental status for birth mothers.36 The
intent test from Johnson was meant to determine parental status
when the UPA does not apply.37 As seen in Johnson, intent can be
the dominant factor in determining parental status over traditional
understandings of parentage, such as being the “natural mother.”38
The K.M. v. E.G. case introduced a new issue regarding lesbian
parentage: co-maternity. In this case, the biological mother, K.M.,
sought recognition as the legal parent over the birth mother, E.G.,
who was impregnated via IVF using K.M.’s ova fertilized with
sperm from an anonymous donor.39 After their relationship ended,
E.G. argued that she intended to be the sole parent of the children
while K.M. claimed that the two women had been raising the
children together since birth.40 K.M.’s attorney argued that “[i]f
these same facts arose between a husband and wife during a divorce
proceeding in which both parties were the genetic and gestational
parents of these children, there would not be any valid dispute over
parentage.”41 The court ultimately recognized both K.M. and E.G.
as legal parents, going against the intent test promulgated in
Johnson. The court essentially chose to acknowledge the parties’
status as functional parents over their clear intent to have only one
of them recognized as the legal parent.
With marriage-like relationships such as those in Holtzman
and K.M. now deemed sufficient to indicate parental function and
intent, the next logical step is recognition of additional non-married
and non-biological parents.

33. Id.
34. Id. at 781.
35. Id. at 782.
36. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 3(1) (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1973) (“The parent
and child relationship between a child and (1) the natural mother may be established
by proof of her having given birth to the child . . . .”).
37. 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993).
38. Id.
39. 117 P.3d 673, 675 (Cal. 2005).
40. Id.
41. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11, K.M. v. E.G. (Ca. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2003) (No.
A101754), 2003 WL 23893651.
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II. Recognition of Same-Sex Families Prior to Obergefell
As previously mentioned, parental recognitions started
shifting away from being defined solely by biology and marriage in
the late 1960s, as illustrated by the growing legal recognition of
both unmarried biological fathers and married non-biological
stepparents. These developments were not only beneficial to
heterosexual couples but to same-sex couples as well, in that biology
was no longer viewed as a fundamental aspect of parenthood. In
the early 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the
constitutional parental rights of an unmarried father in Stanley v.
Illinois.42 The Court held that
as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a
hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken
from him and that, by denying him a hearing . . . the State
denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.43

The Court further stated that children who are “unlegitimized by a
marriage ceremony . . . cannot be denied the right of other children
because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring,
and important as those arising within a more formally organized
family unit.”44
The Court established in the 1970s and 1980s that biology
might be only part of the parentage equation, with parental conduct
being the other necessary aspect of parenthood required of
unmarried biological fathers.45 The Court explained in Lehr v.
Robinson that “[t]he significance of the biological connection is that
it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring,”46 but that a
father must “accept[] some measure of responsibility for the child’s
future”47 in order to be viewed as a parent. Also in the 1970s, the
Uniform Law Commission established the UPA, which included
what is now commonly known as the “holding out” presumption,
requiring a father to “receive[] the child into his home and openly
hold[] out the child as his natural child” in order to be granted full
parental rights.48 In including this conduct-based language, the
UPA solidified the shift towards recognizing parental status as

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 651–52.
See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 262.
Id.
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 1973).

8

Sua Sponte

[Spring: 1

being more than biological. Finally, non-biological parents within
married heterosexual couples began to gain broader recognition
within the law. These non-traditional families included those with
stepparents and those created using alternate forms of fertilization,
including assisted reproductive technologies such as IVF and sperm
donation.49 These developments illustrate how, in some cases, a
biological connection to a child is only one factor considered in
establishing parental rights.
Advocates for same-sex marriage and family equality used
these new parental recognitions of unmarried, biological fathers
and married, non-biological parents to show that a new model of
parenthood was emerging that could recognize the non-marital,
non-biological parent-child relationships such as those of a samesex couple using IVF or sperm donation.50 In summary, in the years
leading up to the decision in Obergefell, the definition of legal
parentage moved away from being defined by biology, gender,
sexual orientation, and marriage, to instead being defined more by
the intent and conduct of the parties raising a child as a family.
III. The Post-Obergefell Landscape
A. Recognizing Functional and Intentional Parentage
As outlined in Section II, proponents of same-sex marriage
prior to Obergefell argued that same-sex couples are as capable as
different-sex couples with regard to parenting, and that the
similarities are not related to biology or gender, but instead are
related to the functional and intentional relationships displayed
within both groups. Opponents of marriage equality instead relied
on conservative, child-centered arguments to justify same-sex
marriage bans,51 insisting that the ideal form of parenting includes
a married mother and father, which sets same-sex couples outside

49. Id. at § 5(a) (“If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the
consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a
man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of a child thereby conceived.”).
50. Joanna L. Grossman, Parentage Without Gender, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 717, 731 (2016) (arguing that same-sex relationships are capable of showing
the same type of family commitment and function as that of a married heterosexual
couple and that second-parent adoption was used as an equitable remedy for samesex couples denied equality).
51. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 248 (2006) (describing
how children benefit from exposure to a “‘model family,’ in which the husband is the
father and his wife is the mother”).
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of this ideal.52 In order to counter the opposition’s view that
marriage and heterosexual procreation go hand in hand, those
fighting for marriage equality turned to cases on unmarried fathers
and stepparents in order to establish conduct and intent, not
biology, as the key to parentage. In establishing marriage equality,
the Obergefell Court also established that a functional and
intentional model of parenthood included not only same-sex
families, but could also include other non-traditional families that
exist outside of marriage.
The marital presumption is a traditional notion that any child
born to a married woman is presumed to be the biological and legal
child of the husband, regardless of whether he is actually the
biological father. With same-sex couples, there are very limited
scenarios that would result in both partners having a biological
connection to the child, meaning that non-biological parents would
almost exclusively rely on the marital presumption or adoption to
attain parental status alongside their partner as a biological parent.
As mentioned earlier, the “holding out” concept could apply to an
unmarried non-biological partner in a same-sex marriage to
determine whether that person had the appropriate parent-like
relationship with the child to be deemed a legal parent.
In the wake of Obergefell, courts are faced with determining
how to rework the marital presumption to address certain issues
regarding same-sex families, such as who is allowed to be listed on
a birth certificate. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the
state is not constitutionally required to grant lesbian couples a birth
certificate that lists both female partners as mothers to a child
conceived through donor insemination.53 The court stated that the
Arkansas statute in question regarding birth certificates “centers
on the relationship of the biological mother and the biological father
to the child, not on the marital relationship of husband and wife,”
and therefore, the statute does not go against the ruling in
Obergefell.54
Some states continue to define the marital
52. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating that families with married mothers and fathers “provide the
stability that marriage affords and the presence of both male and female authority
figures, which it considers critical to optimal childhood development and
socialization”).
53. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 180 (Ark. 2016) (“[W]e cannot say that
naming the nonbiological spouse on the birth certificate of the child is an interest of
the person so fundamental that the State must accord the interest its respect under
either statute.”). The Supreme Court granted petition for writ of certiorari and
reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings
in light of Obergefell. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017).
54. Smith, 505 S.W.3d at 178.
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presumption for same-sex couples by biology, even though the same
is not always true for opposite-sex couples.55
Recent case law is still somewhat split between recognizing
equal rights for non-biological parents or instead continuing to limit
those rights. The Court of Appeals of New York held that “a person
who is not a biological or adoptive parent may obtain standing to
petition for custody or visitation,”56 which overruled an earlier New
York decision stating that a biologically unrelated third party will
not be considered a parent in regards to seeking custody, even if the
party has a “close and loving relationship with the child.”57 The
later court cited social science research that highlights the trauma
suffered “as a result of separation from a primary attachment
figure—such as a de facto parent—regardless of that figure’s
biological or adoptive ties to the children.”58 This decision brought
New York in line with most other states regarding the rights of de
facto parents to seek visitation and custody.59
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
in Partanen v. Gallagher that a person may establish him or herself
as a child’s presumptive parent in the absence of a biological
relationship with the child.60 Partanen, the non-biological and nonbirth mother, was not listed on either of her children’s birth
certificates, nor did she ever adopt the children, but she
participated in raising the children from the time of their birth and
she and her partner, the biological mother, held themselves out as
the children’s parents.61 The court reasoned that Partanen showed
that the children were born to both her and her partner with “the
full acknowledgment, participation, and consent” of Partanen and
“with the shared intention that [the parties] would both be parents
to the resulting children.”62 The ruling in this case applies broadly
to any non-biological parent.
55. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(a) (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 700.2114(1)(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 891.41 (2017) (using the word “natural” to
define the presumption of paternity).
56. In re Brook S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 28 N.Y.3d 1, 28 (N.Y. 2016).
57. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 655 (N.Y. 1991).
58. Brooke S.B., 28 N.Y.3d at 25.
59. See, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 19 (Me. 2014) (holding that the court
may award visitation to a “person with significant bonds to the child” who has had
more than a “limited relationship to the child”); Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d 79, 83–
84 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that custody shall be determined “in accordance with
the best interests of the child and equal consideration shall be given to each parent
and to any de facto custodian”) (internal citations omitted).
60. 59 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Mass. 2016).
61. Id. at 1136.
62. Id. at 1142.
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The intent and conduct of parties has become increasingly
relevant in custody and visitation disputes as states move away
from biology and marriage as the primary determinants of
parentage. Two recent Indiana cases deal with this notion. In
Gardenour v. Bondelie, the court held that the non-biological
mother in a lesbian partnership was the child’s legal parent under
Indiana law.63 She was awarded joint legal custody, visitation, and
was ordered to pay child support.64 The court relied on two cases
dealing with heterosexual couples using a sperm donor in which the
court established that because both parties knowingly and
voluntarily consented to the artificial insemination, the nonbiological father was a legal parent and was required to pay child
support after the couple separated.65 The second case, Sheetz v.
Sheetz, involves a married couple who held out the child of an affair
as their own for 12 years, even though the child was conceived while
the husband was in prison.66 The Indiana Court of Appeals ordered
the husband, a non-biological father, to pay child support, stating
that any other ruling would essentially leave the minor “without a
father.”67 The court relied in all of these cases on the non-biological
parent holding out the child as their own, regardless of the lack of
a biological connection. In both cases, the court looked to the
parties’ intent and conduct to determine whether the non-biological
parent had parental rights.
Not all courts find in favor of parental rights for the nonbiological parent. The Michigan Court of Appeals issued an opinion
denying legal standing to a non-biological lesbian partner who had
co-parented the child in question since birth.68 The biological
mother denied all contact with their son after their relationship
ended.69 The court relied on Michigan Supreme Court precedent,70
63. 60 N.E.3d 1109, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
64. Id. at 1121.
65. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1994); Engelking v. Engelking,
982 N.E.2d 326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
66. 63 N.E.3d 1077, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
67. Id. at 1083.
68. Lake v. Putnam, 894 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
69. Id. at 68.
70. Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15 (Mich. 1999) (holding that the equitable
parent doctrine, which gives de facto parents standing to seek custody and visitation
in court, can only be recognized in the context of a legal marriage). The court
majority refused to recognize a heterosexual man who co-parented his former
girlfriend’s children as an equitable parent, making no reference to the “best interest
of the child” standard. Since same-sex couples could not marry in Michigan until
2015, same-sex parents could legally be denied equitable parent protection, meaning
that the biological parent could elect to completely remove a child from the life of the
non-biological parent.
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which rejected the argument that holding oneself out as a child’s
parent alone is sufficient to be considered that child’s parent under
the equitable parent doctrine.71
It is arguable that the Obergefell decision exacerbates
concerns that courts will continue to limit paths to legal parentage
outside of marriage for any parents, since Obergefell describes
marriage as “a keystone of our social order.”72 The Obergefell Court
goes on further to state that
[w]ithout the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage
offers . . . children [of same-sex couples] suffer the stigma of
knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried
parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more
difficult and uncertain family life.73

Even considering that states are still seeking to deny equal
rights to non-biological parents, marriage equality has allowed the
courts to recognize an ever-expanding array of non-traditional
parents, at least for those who are married. Questions remain
regarding how the courts will treat parties that do not follow
traditional gender-based constructs. In a recent decision out
Louisiana, the state Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the
trial court’s decision denying a petition for custody by a nonbiological transgender male partner of the birth mother.74 It is
interesting to ponder what the Court would have decided if the
parties were legally married,75 since the marital presumption would
hold the male partner in a marriage as the presumed natural
father, regardless of whether he was the biological father.
B. Recognizing Non-Traditional Families in the Wake of
Recent Technological Advancements
Marriage equality has made possible parental structures
based on intent and function and, in turn, has arguably moved
parentage away from being defined solely by biology, gender, sexual
orientation, and marital status. Marriage equality is only the
beginning though, in terms of recognizing non-traditional families,
as there are many scenarios that do not incorporate marriage at all.
Section A of this Part briefly discussed some non-traditional ideas
71. Id. at 23.
72. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
73. Id. at 2600 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–95 (2013)).
74. Ferrand v. Ferrand, 221 So.3d 909 (La. Ct. App. 2016).
75. Id. at 918–19 n.9 (stating that Vincent, the male partner, testified that they
were a same-sex couple at the time of their union, and as a result they were unable
to obtain a marriage license at that time).
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about parentage, specifically regarding the use of assisted
reproductive technology and also regarding parents who do not fit
traditional gender constructs.
As reproductive technology
continues to develop, the reality of having a single biological parent,
three or more biological parents, or even same-sex biological
parents is growing near. In response to technological advances like
mitochondrial gene therapy, which can implant the cells of one
female into the egg of another female, courts that elevate biological
ties above all else will need to grapple with this new form of nontraditional, yet biological, parenthood.
Marriage equality has the potential to normalize certain
alternative forms of reproduction, such as surrogacy and IVF,
simply because of the frequency with which same-sex couples use
these methods to start a family. Surrogacy contracts are still
forbidden in some states,76 so the shifting landscape caused by
marriage equality could benefit more than just same-sex couples.
Additionally, the functional and intentional parentage ideals that
have flourished post-marriage-equality could potentially lead to
broader recognition of multiple-parent families. As mentioned
above, In re M.C. featured three people with parentage claims: a
biological mother, her same-sex spouse, and the biological father
with whom the biological mother had a sexual relationship.77 When
the Court ruled that the UPA only allowed two parents, the
California legislature responded with a multiple-parent bill
allowing a court to declare more than two legal parents if not doing
so would be detrimental to the child.78 Marriage equality is just one
mechanism used to broaden recognition for non-traditional
parentage regimes, but it is not required in order for states to
recognize new forms of parentage. States that prohibited same-sex
marriage prior to Obergefell recognized multiple parents in some
cases. In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, the court recognized that three
individuals—a biological mother, a non-biological mother, and a
sperm donor—may have parental rights and obligations.79 Families
with multiple parents can be formed by same-sex and different-sex
couples, both in and out of marriage, so legal recognition is not
limited to certain situations involving only same- or opposite-sex
couples in or outside of marriage. What the future will hold for non-

76. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2011);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010).
77. 195 Cal. App. 4th 197, 202 (Cal. App. 2d 2011).
78. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2013).
79. 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
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traditional parentage will be unpredictable, and it will likely
continue to grow.
IV. Deciding When to Withhold or Withdraw Legal Parental
Rights in Response to the Shifting Landscape
This Note concludes by attempting to establish the situations
in which parental rights should not be recognized. There are two
general categories where it might not be appropriate for someone to
have parental rights. The first can be described as the caregiverversus-legal-parent determination. In this category, it is sometimes
difficult to determine when it is appropriate to recognize a
caregiver—which is defined as a person who is not a parent, “but
who nevertheless is allocated and exercises residential
responsibility or custodial responsibility” for a child80—as a legal
parent and when it might not be necessary. The second category
includes situations where a legal parent should have their rights
eliminated, such as in instances where the child is the product of
rape.
Caregivers can exist in many forms. The most common
caregivers are parents. At issue in this section are non-biological
caregivers, such as stepparents and grandparents or extended
family. Caregivers are also relevant in multiple-parent situations,
such as co-parenting families where there might be two separate
sets of partners jointly raising a child, or in families where there
are multiple people caring for and raising a child. When there are
several people vying for parental rights, even if all of the parties are
in agreement about co-parenting together, the possibility of causing
harm to the child increases if those relationships deteriorate,
causing uncertainty regarding who is legally recognized as a parent
and who is not.
Additional issues can arise when multiple parents come in and
out of a child’s life. Should each successive partner attain parental
rights simply through the marital presumption or by holding out
the child? Is it in the best interests of a child to have multiple
parties exchanging parental rights over the child? The answers to
these questions ultimately rely on the intent of the parties. If a
parent intends for each successive partner to become their child’s
legal parent, the court should recognize them as such. What is more
difficult is determining if there should be some limit to how many
parents can be recognized for one child. Since many children of
80. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02(7) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
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divorce already have two sets of parents, a logical cap would be to
only recognize legal status for up to four parents of a child at any
given time, regardless of biological or familial ties. However, there
is no similar framework to help determine how many parents over
time should be allowed to have parental rights. Ideally, only those
who come into a child’s life with the intention of remaining involved
indefinitely should be granted parental rights.
The second category includes those who arguably do not
deserve to be recognized as parents, but are often still recognized as
parents in some form under the law. Within this category are
rapists, parents who sexually abuse or otherwise mentally or
physically harm their partners or children, and absent parents who
only return later in a child’s life seeking to regain the parental
rights that they abandoned. Since parental rights are viewed as
fundamental rights in the United States, these rights are not easily
removed.81 In order to overcome biology and remove someone’s
parental rights, there must be “grave and weighty reasons” for such
a removal.82
In S.J. v. L.T., the court held that a biological father’s parental
rights would not be terminated even though he was convicted of
sexually assaulting the mother and there was ample evidence that
the child was conceived because of that sexual assault.83
Additionally, the issue of abuse frequently involves the distinction
between physical custody and visitation. If a parent does not have
physical custody, courts are hesitant to deny them visitation rights.
In Arnold v. Naughton, the court held that a noncustodial father
who sexually abused his child could still have supervised visitation
rights.84 In Bobbitt v. Eizenga, the trial court held that a man had
no rights to custody or visitation due to a North Carolina statute
that denied custody and visitation rights to persons convicted of
“first and second degree rape” that resulted in the birth of a child.85
The state Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because this case
concerned a man convicted of “attempted statutory rape,” the
statute did not apply.86 The court went further to hold that without
specific legislation regarding “attempted statutory rape,” the court

81. Kara N. Bitar, The Parental Rights of Rapists, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
275, 276 (2012).
82. S.J. v. L.T., 727 P.2d 789, 795–97 (Alaska 1986).
83. Id. at 791.
84. 486 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
85. 715 S.E.2d 613, 614 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
86. Id. at 616.
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would not deny visitation to a man convicted of such a crime which
resulted in the birth of a child.87
Since courts are clearly not a reliable source for protecting the
victims of rape from having to share parental rights with their
rapists, legislation is necessary to address this issue. Without
legislation in place to withhold parental rights in these situations,
rapists have the same rights as any other biological parent.88 While
some states have enacted statues that limit the rights of rapists—
and many first require a conviction—some rely heavily on judicial
discretion and most inadequately protect victims from subsequent
trauma.89 Enacting nationwide legislation terminating a rapist’s
parental rights would demonstrate not only that our society sees
rape as an atrocious crime, but also that victims deserve the
protection of the law.
The argument for limiting parental rights in these scenarios
stems from the best interests of the child, while also taking account
of parental conduct. Children who are born because of rape are not
served by allowing the rapist to have a parental claim to them.
Similarly, parents who neglect, abuse, or otherwise harm their
children should not be allowed to retain their parental rights but
instead should have those rights removed to protect the safety and
health of the child. A person’s harmful and abusive conduct should
be grounds for having all parental rights terminated.
There is no clear line between when legal status should be
given to an individual and when it should be taken away, but this
Note suggests that there are at least two categories that outline
situations in which parental recognition should be limited to a
certain number of recognized parents and when recognition simply
is not appropriate. As the law expands and societal understandings
of families and parenthood continue to develop, courts will have to
grapple with what is right, what is in the best interests of a child,
and what is the law. Above all, parental conduct should be the
deciding factor in cases that come close to this line.
Conclusion
With the expansion of parentage laws in the 1960s and 1970s
to recognize unmarried, biological fathers and non-biological
stepparents, and now with the establishment of marriage equality,
both married and unmarried couples, of both same- and opposite87. Id.
88. See Bitar, supra note 81, at 285.
89. Id. at 291–93.
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sex, we are seeing a shift toward a broader understanding of what
it means to be a parent. Marriage equality challenged the
traditions of biology that once defined parenthood and in turn
helped broaden the understanding of parentage to include things
like parental conduct and intent. This shifting understanding of
what defines a family and what makes a person a parent will
continue to evolve as new technology further challenges our
understanding of reproduction and as new forms of family challenge
our ideas about what is in the best interest of a child. The continual
evolution of parentage will force courts to make increasingly
judgment-based determinations as to what constitutes a legal
parent and what does not and what truly is in the best interests of
a child. While there is no clear line between who should and who
should not have parental rights, it is critical for all states to
establish legislation regarding scenarios where parental rights
should not be given by default, such as when children are born as a
result of rape. Ultimately, parental conduct should be considered
over intent, marriage, or even biology, when deciding who should
have parental rights.

